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Abstract 
Publication or citation rankings have become the principal indicators of the scientific 
worth of universities and countries, and determine to a large extent the career of 
individual scholars. We argue that such rankings do not effectively measure research 
]uality, which should in fact be the essence of evaluation. For that reason, an alternative 
ranking is developed based on membership on academic editorial boards of professional 
journals. This ranking considers the reputation and recognition of scholars among their 
peers and their contributions to the research community in terms of reading and 
reviewing the work of others. We compare the results of both measurements by using a 
sample of 5,7Q4 international top-management scholars. It turns out that publication 
rankings are not linear but related to board membership in an inverted U-shape. The 
finding suggests that maximizing publications disregards other essential aspects of 
research ]uality that are doubtlessly hard to measure. It follows that, if career decisions 
are only based on high scores in publication rankings, the result will be haphazard.  
This article does not propagate as the gold standard a ranking based on board 
membership, but rather wants to call attention to the significant shortcomings of 
publication and citation rankings. They disregard important scholarly contributions, e.g. 
the investment in multiple and/or difficult tasks, which, nonetheless, are important for 
research ]uality. In the long run ]uantitative research rankings therefore may crowd out 
such contributions and thus worsen instead of improve, research ]uality. 
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1. Introduction 
Rankings in terms of the number of  publications and citations are today a popular 
method of examining and mapping the intellectual impact of scientists, projects, 
journals, disciplines, faculties, universities and nations abarfield (1Q7Q)e ,orgman 
(1QQ0)e Moed (2005)e Judge et al. (2007)e Meho (2007)e Cronin and Meho (2008)e 
Fabel et al. (2008)e Handelsblatt (200Q)g. The method has been used increasingly 
worldwide for policymaking, to monitor scientific developments, as well as a basis for 
promotions, tenure, hiring, salary, and grants decisions aCronin (1QQ6)e White and 
McCain (1QQ8)e Small (1QQQ)e Warner (2000)e ,orgman and Furner (2002)e Weingart 
(2005)g.  
Rankings are quantitativee they indicate the position or rather the significance of a 
scholar, university or country relative to others. However, it is quality that should be 
considered the essence of scientific research rankings ae.g. Johnes (1Q88)g: for the 
benefit of society it does not much matter how many publications have been authored, 
and how many citations have been accumulated. What should matter are the 
advancement of new insights and their value aAdler and Harzing (200Q)g, i.e. whether 
the research is useful, satisfies stated or implied needs, is free of deficiencies, and meets 
more general, social re]uirements asee e.g. Reedijk (1QQ8)e Nightingale and Scott 
(2007)g. Efforts have been made to include ]uality aspects in rankings, for example by 
counting only those publications and citations which appear in scientific journals of 
jacceptablek ]uality or by considering jimpactk factors which take into account the 
ranking of a journal in which a publication or citation appears. Nevertheless, the 
resulting rankings take the ]uality aspects of research activity into account to a limited 
extent only. For simplicity, in the following the rankings based on publications and 
citations will be called “quantitative”. They will be compared to what will be called 
“qualitative” rankings based on membership in the scientific boards of academic 
journals, which consider the reputation and recognition of scholars among their peers. 
Scholarly reputation depends on a great many factors, but the ]ualitative aspect is 
certainly central1. 
This paper argues that the current bibliometric rankings, based on the number of 
publications and citations, should be looked at much more critically than is the rule 
                                                 
1 Quantitative and ]ualitative rankings are not strictly separable as both contain elements of the other. The 
distinction is solely made for reasons of simplicity. 
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today. Publication and citation rankings2 have become the major, and sometimes even 
the only, indicator of the scientific worth of universities and countries, and determine to 
a large extent the careers of individual scholars. Whether a person gets a position as an 
assistant professor at a university, whether he or she attains tenure and is promoted to 
full professor, or whether he or she receives research funding, depends to a large extent 
on their publication and citation record, as published in the various rankings. We show 
that rankings produce ]uite different results, depending on what proxy is used to capture 
aspects of scientific ]uality. For that reason, an alternative ranking is developed and 
considered as a ]uality indicator, based on membership on academic editorial boards of 
professional journals. This ranking may be argued to constitute a good approximation of 
the appreciation, and hence the ]uality, attributed by professional peers.  
A significant result of our empirical study is that “quantitative” and “qualitative” 
rankings are not linearly related to each other. Instead, the number of publications 
shows an inverted u-shaped relationship to scholars selected as board members. This 
suggests that persons scoring high in publication rankings will score only modestly in 
our alternative ranking. For this reason high scores in publication rankings should not 
become the only goal of research evaluation. Publication rankings disregard features 
that are difficult to measure aHolmstrlm and Milgrom (1QQ1)g. We do not claim that the 
ranking based on editorial board membership, here developed, constitutes a better 
ranking method. However, we argue that publication rankings disregard other, 
important scholarly contributions. 
Section 2 gives a short overview of the rankings currently in use, based on 
publications and citations, and identifies their shortcomings. It is discussed how, and to 
what extent, ]uality is captured by an alternative definition of scientific worth, namely 
membership on editorial boards. Section 3 presents the empirical results for a sample of 
5,7Q4 researchers who in the period from 1QQ7-2007 published their research in at least 
one of 11 international top-journals of the management and organization research 
community. In 200Q, 1,316 scholars held at least one editor, co-editor or board position 
in these journals. Section 4 argues that, due to the substantial instability of scientific 
rankings, more care should be taken when using rankings for decision-making, in 
particular when making decisions about the careers of individual scholars.  
                                                 
2 Examples of prominent rankings are ISI Web of Knowledge Journal Citation Report aThe Thomson 
Corporation (2008)ge VH,-JOURQUA`2 aHennig-Thurau et al. (2004)e Schrader and Hennig-Thurau 
(200Q)ge WU Journal Rating aWirtschaftsuniversitCt Wien (2008)ge or Handelsblatt Ranking aHandelsblatt 
(2007)g. 
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2. Current Scientific Rankings 
2.1. Quantitative Rankings 
Evaluating scientific ]uality is notoriously difficult. jOne such difficulty is that the 
production of research typically involves multiple sources of input and output, which 
makes the use of standard parametric techni]ues problematic. Another, more serious 
problem is that only minimal nengineering’ knowledge is usually available to analyze 
the interrelationship between the research inputs that are used and the research outputs 
that are producedk aCherchye and Vanden (2005): 4Q6g. Ideally, established experts in 
the field should scrutinize the published scientific results. In practice, however, 
committees with general competence, rather than specialists, often evaluate primary 
research data. In the past, these committees used peer review and other expert-based 
judgments until claims were made that expert judgments could be biased and, therefore, 
be inferior to seemingly objective measures, such as the number of publications and 
citations aHorrobin (1QQ0)e Moxham and Anderson (1QQ2)g. The opinions of experts 
may indeed be influenced by subjective elements, narrow mindedness, and limited 
cognitive horizons. These shortcomings may result in conflicts of interest, unawareness 
of ]uality, or a negative bias against young scientists or newcomers to a particular field. 
Today, these committees tend to employ secondary criteria,3 and it is hardly surprising 
that the prevalent ranking principle for evaluating research focuses on ]uantity, which 
appears to be an objective indicator directly related to published science aAdler et al. 
(2008)g. 
Such bibliometric indicators have a number of advantages. First, the data are easily 
available, for example, from publication lists or other data sources like the Web of 
Science. Second, bibliometric counts seem to be objective indicators. Third, the 
comparison between a large number of candidates or institutions is facilitated. When the 
number of publications and the number of citations are collected, an effort is also made 
to take into account the importance or the ]uality of what is published. 
The publication measures reflect the scientific publications in which papers have 
appeared. Thus, for example, most rankings ignore publications such as books, general 
                                                 
3 Rigby and Edler a(2005)g analyzed the degree to which the bibliometric information of 16Q research 
groups in economics, econometrics, and business administration relates to the assessment results of three 
evaluation committees. More than half of the variance of the overall ]uality judgments of the committees 
can be predicted by using a handful of bibliometric variables, notably the number of publications in top 
class and international refereed journals, the number of international proceedings, and the number of 
Dutch journal articles. 
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public notices, handbooks, and other collections of articles, as well as anything 
published in a non-refereed journal aJohnes (1Q88)e Reedijk (1QQ8)e Donovan and 
,utler (2007)e Adler and Harzing (200Q)g. Publications in refereed journals are 
categorized according to the prominence of the journal measured by impact factors.4 
However, they are subject to various problems. First, it is neglected that the citation 
rates of an article determine the impact factor of a journal, but not the reverse aSeglen 
(1QQ7)g. Seglen a(1QQ4)g shows that 15 percent of the articles account for 50 percent of 
the impact factor of a journal. Other research points out that many top articles are 
published in lower ranked journals, and many average articles are published in higher 
ranked journals aSingh et al. (2007)e Adler and Harzing (200Q)g. Second, the obscure 
weighting of journals according to their prominence often coincides with a remarkable 
incompleteness of the data base aAdler and Harzing (200Q)e Albers (200Q)g.  
It is hardly surprising that the ranking positions of scholars depend on the precise 
execution of the rankings aCoupq (2003)e Meho and Rogers (2008)g. The effort to 
capture a ]ualitative aspect in the current rankings relies largely on citations. Citations 
in more prominent journals (where prominence is again measured in terms of citations) 
are weighted higher in the rankings than those in lesser journals. Thus, the procedure is 
recursive. This entire process originally started with journal analyses, but nowadays has 
been extended to include countries, universities, institutes, and even individual 
researchers. In a sense, the academic world has gradually become obsessed with impact 
factors. Citation records are considered a benchmark establishing the ability to do high 
]uality research, not only for authors, librarians, and journal publishers, but also for 
science policy makers ae.g. Nederhof and van Raan (1QQ3)g. According to this view, 
citations are taken as evidence that the individual, the journal, the institute, or the 
country cited has carried out work that is judged to be relevant to current research 
frontier and is useful to those attempting to extend the frontiers aDiamond (1Q86)g. 
However, to the extent that citations inade]uately account for scientific ]uality, the 
corresponding rankings distort the informative function they claim to provide. 
The use of citations as an indicator of scientific ]uality reveals five major 
shortcomings.  
                                                 
4 Many journal rankings according to citations have been undertaken  ae.g. `iebowitz and Palmer (1Q84)e 
Diamond (1Q8Q)e `aband and Piette (1QQ4)e Cheng et al. (1QQ5)e Hennig-Thurau et al. (2004)e Paul 
(2004)e Sombatsompop et al. (2004)e Podsakoff et al. (2005)e Handelsblatt (200Q)e Schrader and Hennig-
Thurau (200Q)g. 
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First, they do not take into account whether a scholar’s contribution is valuable and 
furthers the course of scientific knowledge, is neutral, or hinders scientific progress. The 
latter happens if it promotes an unproductive or even unsound approach, theory, 
method, or result. If ]ualitative aspects were taken seriously, unproductive citations 
would be given a zero rating and counterproductive citations would weigh negatively.  
Second, scholars are human beings subject to the same influences as every other 
individual. Following fashionable trends or herding behavior are examples of such 
influences a,anerjee (1QQ2)e ,ikhchandani et al. (1QQ2)e Chamley and bale (1QQ4)g 
where scholars ]uote papers simply because they have previously been cited by other 
researchers. Simkin and Roychowdhury a(2005)e (2006)e (2007)g show that the 
probability of a scholar being cited is affected by the number of citations he or she 
already has. This jMatthew Effectk in science aMerton (1Q68)g leads to the emergence 
of jstark papers and authors a,arabrsi and Albert (1QQQ)e ,onitz et al. (1QQQ)e Faria 
(2005)e ,accini and ,arabesi (2008)g. These stars are like social celebrities whose only 
claim to fame is, that they are famous, but few know or care about how they reached 
stardom. In the case of celebrities, this is of little relevance as their main objective is to 
entertain. However, in the case of science where a commitment to the search for 
knowledge and understanding is so important, such citations should be put into a 
different categorye they should not count as positive contributions. 
Third, the fact that a particular work has been cited does not mean that it has been 
read aDonovan (2006)g. While no scholar would be foolish enough to publicly admit 
that he or she cited articles without having read them, there is now empirical evidence 
that this does occur to a significant extent. Evidence of this can be found in the identical 
misprints that appear repeatedly in citations. Such misprints are most likely to occur 
when authors copy reference lists contained in other’s papers. ,ased on a careful 
statistical analysis, Simkin and Roychowdhury a(2005)g conclude that about 70YQ0 
percent of scientific citations are copied from the lists of references used in other 
papers. While this result does not automatically imply that all citations copied from 
reference lists are not read, it is an indication that some papers cited have not been read 
by those citing them. 
Fourth, citation counts do not indicate ]uality independent of the contested 
knowledge a,eed and ,eed (1QQ6)g. In contested disciplines, such as management or 
other social sciences, differential citation counts indicate which author, article, or 
journal embraces the dominant theory most completely and which does not a`ee 
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(2006)g. Articles embracing unfamiliar reasoning and arguments are assumed to have 
unimportant content and, therefore, are hardly cited. Thus, differences in citation 
rankings often reflect the subjective or ideological rejection of the theory employed 
rather than the research ]uality or the importance of the research to the discipline. 
Conse]uently, in departments or universities where tenure, promotions, salaries, and 
department funding are affected by citation rankings, controversial findings, which are 
mostly published in less prestigious journals, are penalized aCoats (1Q71)e ,ell and 
Seater (1Q78)e ,rCuninger and Haucap (2003)e `ee (2006)g. Evaluations relying on 
citation counts, therefore, crowd out the crucially important innovative research in the 
social sciences. They encourage a detrimental homogeneity in science, as has been 
shown for business schools abioia and Corley (2002)g. 
Fifth, it is widely accepted as a best practice in the bibliometric community not to 
apply publication and citation measures to individuals, but to higher levels of 
aggregation, in particular, to universities or countries avan Raan (2003)g. ,ibliometric 
scientists argue that although these indicators may make sense in the natural and life 
sciences such indicators prove problematic in the social and behavioral sciences where 
journals play a lesser role as primary communication channelse many research fields are 
locally oriented, and older literature is more dominant avan Raan (2003)g. In fact, these 
restrictions are often disregarded asee for example the ranking attempts of berman 
business scholars or economists by ,ommer and Ursprung (1QQ8)e Handelsblatt (2006),  
(2007)e Fabel et al. (2008)e Handelsblatt (200Q)g.5 The benefit of such proceedings is 
doubtful and may negatively affect the ]uality of the social sciences. 
The list of shortcomings could easily be extended to include the different citation 
habits of authors in different fields and subfields, the selectivity of citations by authors 
(e.g., easily available papers are cited more often), unintended spelling errors by authors 
in citation lists, mistakes in counting and classifying citations and accrediting them to 
journals and authors, and the inclusion of self-citations (especially by determining the 
journal impact factor).6 On account of all these shortcomings when using citations as 
reliable indicators of scientific ]uality, there is good reason to consider alternative 
                                                 
5 Even though the Handelsblatt Ranking is more accepted in economics it rapidly spreads in the field of 
business administration and becomes accepted. For example, some berman business scholars documented 
their ranking position on their homepages, faculties published their rankings in newspapers, or 
appointments committees nowadays use the Handelsblatt Journal Ranking to compare the publication lists 
of applicants in the field of business administration.      
6 Some editors freely admit that they encourage authors to cite as many publications in their journal as 
possible in order to raise their impact factor abarfield (1QQ7)g. 
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approaches. The next section discusses the possibility of taking ]uality into account by 
considering the reputation of scholars among their peers, approximated by counting 
membership on scientific editorial boards. 
2.2. Qualitative Rankings 
Scientific knowledge is not some immutable objective stock that grows 
]uantitativelye rather, it is fallible, historically contingent, contestable, and changes 
unpredictably and ]ualitatively. This is especially true for the social sciences. What 
constitutes scientific knowledge depends on the approval by the scientific community 
a`ee (2006)g. A defining characteristic of any science is that its participants consider 
themselves members of a community of scholars. When producing scientific 
knowledge, they depend to some degree on each other. Scientists who do not fit into this 
structure of dependency or do not produce the jrightk kind of knowledge are not 
permitted to be part of the community. For this reason, embeddedness in a research 
community is a ]uality indicator of research. It ensures that the scientists and their 
research meet research standards accepted by their scientific community, for example, 
utilizing proven research techni]ues. 
Professional scientific journals are the publication outlets for different research 
communities. The editorial boards of these journals play a considerable role, both in the 
dissemination of information and in its evaluation by colleagues. jIt appears reasonable 
that these positions are held by people who have the confidence and trust of their 
colleagues in the journal’s areas of coverage for the journal to be successful in attracting 
]uality submissions.k aKaufman (1Q84): 11Q0g. In this respect, the editorial boards 
constitute the true experts in the research community, and being appointed an editorial 
board member is not only a great honor, but can also be seen as one indicator of 
scientific ]uality. 
The board fulfils two different functions: (1) it assists the editors in choosing the 
most suitable articles for the respective scientific field, and (2) membership on the board 
is purely honorific and reflects one’s standing in the profession as evaluated by one’s 
peers. Honorary members are often chosen to signal the orientation of the review (e.g., 
whether its emphasis is on theoretical or empirical work). More importantly, journals 
want to profit from the reputation of honorary board members aKaufman (1Q84)g. The 
more distinguished these members are within their discipline and community, the higher 
 Q
is the journal’s reputation because renowned scholars do not join the boards of poor 
]uality journals (were they to do so, their own reputation would decline). ,oth, when 
board members contribute to editorial decisions and when they are mainly, or only, 
honorary members, the choice of members should be based on ]uality. A (chief) editor 
wants to have scholars at hand who help him or her make the best possible decisionse a 
disreputable individual or person lacking expert knowledge is of little use. At the same 
time, as the scholars represented on boards have an excellent professional reputation, 
membership on boards can be taken to be a reasonable approximation of the ]uality of a 
scholar as judged by his or her peers.7 bibbons and Fish a(1QQ1): 364g take it as a matter 
of course: jCertainly, the more editorial boards an (scholar) is on, the more prestigious 
the (scholar).k 
It should be noted that using editorial board positions as a ]uality indicator also has 
disadvantages. First, examining the membership on editorial boards clearly favors 
established scholars. However, using the number of publications and citations has the 
same disadvantage. This limitation should therefore not bias our results when 
comparing ]uantitative and ]ualitative rankings. Second, one could argue that only a 
small fraction of all scholars are members of editorial boards. This fact distorts the 
results because it includes only the best scientists. However, management scholars in 
many countries have their own journals. Within these journals, the countrywide experts 
of a field are members of editorial boards. While our research will mainly rely on 
scholars who enjoy an international reputation, research evaluation could also include 
country journals, e.g. sbr/ZfbF, DBW, ZfB, or Die Unternehmung. Third, one could 
criticize that some scholars are elected to an editorial board simply because they are 
well known regardless that they are no longer productive. While this argument may be 
true, it would be wrong to conclude that these scholars have no research ]uality. As we 
will show in the next section, a good scholar should be engaged also in other tasks 
besides publishing. In our analysis we will incorporate this criticism by excluding 
editorial board members without publications.  
                                                 
7 This procedure has been put forward in the past and undertaken for small and distinct sets of journals by 
Kaufman a(1Q84)g for finance faculties, Kurtz and ,oone a(1Q88)g for marketing faculties, and bibbons 
a(1QQ0)g for statistics faculties. 
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2.3. Relationship between Quantitative and Qualitative Rankings 
The publication record of a scholar as measured in ]uantitative rankings can be, but 
not necessarily need be, positively correlated with his or her engagement in multiple 
other tasks aFrey (2010)g. ,esides doing research and having their research favorably 
published, the main tasks of scholars are teaching, supporting young scholars, informing 
and advising the public, participating in university administration or reading and 
reviewing the work of other scholars. For the following reasons, it is likely that a 
negative correlation between publishing and the previously mentioned tasks exists.  
! First, because of time-and-effort constraints, few scholars are able to perform 
these tasks sufficiently well and furthermore fully engage in the arduous 
publishing task.  
! Second, a publishing record is easy to measure, while performance with respect to 
the other tasks is not. The multiple-task effect aHolmstrlm and Milgrom (1QQ1)e 
Prendergast (1QQQ)g suggests that academics mainly engage in publishing efforts 
and disregard the other tasks.8  
! Third, the distribution of talent among those scholars who are able to publish in 
the highest ranked journals and those who are not, is likely to overlap. It follows 
that the worst scholars with top publications are less capable to excel in the other 
tasks (they are nnlemons’’) than the best scholars who are without A-level 
publications.  
! Fourth, the writing of articles for A-journals is a ]uite specialized activity 
aStarbuck (200Q)g. Scientist performing well in the specialized activity of writing 
articles for A-journals may perform only modestly in the other six tasks.  
We therefore expect that the position of a scholar in ]uantitative rankings, i.e. his or 
her number of publications, is not strictly related linearly to his or her position in our 
]ualitative rankings, i.e. using editorial board positions as a ]uality indicator. We will 
argue that the position of a scholar in ]uantitative rankings is only linearly related to his 
                                                 
8 Multiple tasking effects can also be obtained with regard to publication strategies aAdler and Harzing 
(200Q)e Osterloh and Frey (200Q)g. To receive high scores in publication and citation rankings may 
become the goal rather than to examine and determine how and why the conducted research may be 
important. There are many examples for such tactics like the jslicing strategyk a,utler (2003)g, i.e. the 
maximization of publications by dividing research into small publishable units, the jacademic 
prostitutionk strategy aFrey (2003)g, i.e. the voluntary deformation of research results, the inclusion of 
wasteful citations, or the adding of famous, imaginary co-authors to survive review processes, or the 
jmediocrityk strategy aOsterloh and Frey (200Q)g, i.e. the decision to conduct uncreative, orthodox 
research to please the average referee and thus to increase the likelihood of publication. 
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or her position in ]ualitative rankings, up to a pointe beyond this point, there is less 
benefit realized from a higher number of publications, and it may constrain the position 
of a scholar in ]ualitative rankings aFrey (2007)g. In theory u-shaped relationships are 
]uite common for innovative or creative activities where multiple outcomes exist 
aPerry-Smith and Shalley (2003)g.  
On the one hand, editorial board members may need a minimum number of 
publications. Scholars who are able to continuously publish their research in reputable 
journals not only show a high research motivation but also talent aCole (1QQ2)g. Having 
such scholars in the editorial board first signals research ]uality and thus improves the 
number and ]uality of submissions to a journal. Second, effort and expert knowledge 
are important to fulfill the tasks within editorial boards, e.g. to distinguish between good 
and excellent research, to identify errors, to evaluate the trustworthiness of research, or 
to responsibly fulfill assignments within short time periods.  
On the other hand, scholars who may represent an excellent choice as editorial board 
member may not have a large number of publications. ,eing visible as a possible 
editorial board member re]uires additional task investments, which reduce the time for 
publishing. In theory this effect has been labeled multitasking effect. For complex 
problems consisting of multiple tasks Y like research - it means that people will or can 
concentrate only on certain tasks and neglect anything else aHolmstrlm and Milgrom 
(1QQ1)g.  
First, scholars who are visible as a possible editorial board member have to be good 
reviewers. ,eing a good reviewer can be, but not necessarily need be, positively 
correlated with the number of publications. Reviewing involves spending valuable time 
on the work of other scholars and wide reading. Reviewing and reading reduces the time 
for writing and publishing. According to the multitasking theory it seems likely that 
many scholars may be ]uiet productive in one of both area but only few scholars will be 
in both areas.  
Second, scholars who are visible as a possible editorial board member should be 
associated with outstanding research content in order to stimulate the research 
community to submit their publications. Outstanding research can be, but not 
necessarily need be, positively correlated with the number of publications. Producing 
meaningful and innovative research content is often slower than producing rigorous but 
less meaningful, standard research content. Further, the acceptance of innovative 
research is far from certain aDasgupta and David (1QQ4)e Nelson (2004)g. Again, it 
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seems likely that only few researchers are able to produce highly innovative research by 
simultaneous maximizing their number of publications. Editorial boards may be more 
interested in innovative research and less interested in the number of publications.  
Third, while both former arguments assume that scholars asked as editorial members 
do not maximize their number of publications, it is as well possible that scholars having 
a large publication record are nevertheless asked to participate in editorial boards but 
are less willing to engage in this task. ,eing a member of an editorial board entails 
time-and-effort constraints. There is less time for publishing and some scholars may 
simply prefer to publish instead of serving on editorial boards.    
It seems thus plausible to assume that the relationship between a scholar’s position in 
the ]uantitative and in the ]ualitative rankings is shaped curvilinear. While a minimum 
of publications may be important to guarantee the recognition of a scholar as a possible 
editorial board member, too many publications may reflect a lack of investment in 
multiple other tasks, which are also essentially important for editorial board members. 
This leads us to the hypothesis that is to be empirically tested: 
Hypothesis 1. The publication record of individual scholars, as measured in 
]uantitative rankings, shows an inverted U-shaped relationship to the probability of 
being selected as an editorial board member as measured in our ]ualitative ranking.  
3. Comparison between Quantitative and Qualitative Rankings 
3.1. Sample 
In order to analyze the systematic non-linear relationship between ]uantitative and 
]ualitative rankings, we selected a sample of journals, which are considered to enjoy an 
excellent international reputation within the field of management and organization. 
This sample is representative for researchers who publish papers on dominant theories 
within this research community. We expect similar effects for other sciences as well as 
for lower-ranked journals. However, it should be noted that our sample does not provide 
a comprehensive overview of all research communities within the organization 
management community. In particular, heterodox research communities embracing 
contested knowledge are excluded a`ee (2008)g. 
To determine the boundaries of our sample of journals we proceeded in three steps. 
First, to include only one and not several citation and publication habits we draw on 
personal experience which journals are read and considered as possible publication 
 13
outlets by scholars of the organization management community. Sub-discipline journals 
strongly related to other fields, e.g. to psychology, innovation management, accounting, 
finance, marketing etc., are excluded.  
Second, to bypass the obscure weighting of articles by impact factors we validate the 
impact-homogeneity of our sample using different journal rankings. Table 1 pictures the 
various ranking positions of the journals included. Column II and III indicate that the 
journals maintain top-positions when only management and business journals of the ISI 
web of knowledge are considered.Q As shown in column I, all journals have high journal 
impact factors reaching from 1.5 up to 5. Columns IV, V, and VI show that all 
publication outlets are classified as A+, A, or , journals within the several ranking. 
Finally, column VII contains a self-constructed measurement of journal impact. It 
measures how often an article is cited correcting for the number of references and thus 
for sub-community size. More references increase the likelihood of citations, which 
should be taken into account. According to this measure, in particular journals lower 
ranked in the former standard proceedings have a higher impact within their sub-
discipline.10  
Table 1 about here 
We collected data on all articles and reviews published in the journals selected within 
the time period 1QQ7-2007. ,ook reviews, editorial material and proceedings were 
excluded. Publications of the years 2008/200Q were excluded for two reasons. First, we 
measure editorial board membership in the year 200Q. The time lag ensures that authors 
who started to publish their research in 2008/200Q - and thus had no chance of being 
considered a possible board candidate - are excluded. Second, we use the average 
number of yearly citations and the journal impact factor as control measures. On 
average, articles get most citations two years after they are published abarfield (1Q7Q)g. 
This information helps to standardize citation rates. To identify multiple articles of one 
                                                 
Q The missing ranking positions are shared by marketing and finance journals, i.e. by different research 
communities. 
10 We further cross-validated the community-aspect by analyzing journal relatedness. First, we evaluated 
the percentage of citations between the journals (information available in ISI web of knowledge). The 
results substantiated that the included journals often refer to each other indicating one community. 
Second, we examined how often authors have articles in two or more of the included journals. The 
findings validated that many scholars indeed publish in several journals of our sample. Third, we 
examined how often scholars are editor board members in two or more of the included journals. The 
findings validated that the included journals are related to each other by cross-editorship. 
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scholar and his or her editorial board membership, the data were checked by using the 
institutions and countries of scholars with ambiguous names or initials of first names.  
3.2. Dependent variable 
Editorial board membership. In May 200Q we consulted the homepage of each 
journal in our sample and collected the names of scholars who served as editors, co-
editors, or board members at that time. Various definitions of editorial board 
membership are possible: (1) the broadest possible definition includes all positions, i.e. 
editor, co-editor and board member. In our initial sample 1,316 persons held at least one 
editor, co-editor or board position. 16.4s individuals had more than one position. We 
constructed a variable jEditor Board Membershipk in 200Q, identifying the number of 
editor, co-editor or board member positions of a person. (2) The board definition solely 
includes board member positions. In our initial sample 1,181 persons held at least one 
board position. 15.3s had more than one position. We constructed a variable jBoard 
Membershipk indicating the number of board member positions of a person in 200Q.  
465 scholars, all board members, never published an article within the journals 
selected during the last 10 years. This finding is a first indication of the accuracy of our 
hypothesis suggesting that the publication record of scholars does not inevitably reflect 
his or her ability to perform well as an editorial board member. The finding could, 
however, reflect the need for appropriate representation, e.g. with respect to the 
representation of different countries. These scholars without publications were excluded 
from our statistical analysis because one could argue that the empirical findings are 
driven by lazily scholars sitting in editorial boards.11 For the regression analysis our 
measurements of jEditor ,oard Membershipk considered 851 active editors, co-editors 
or board members and of j,oard Membershipk 716 active board members. 
3.3. Independent variable 
Publication record. For each author we counted all articles published in the selected 
journals. We adjusted for tenure effects since experienced scholars have a higher 
probability of being a board member. For each scholar we calculated the yearly number 
of articles published beginning with the year of his or her first publication. For example, 
if a scholar published his or her first article in the year 2000, we averaged the number of 
                                                 
11 The empirical findings are however comparable if editors without publications are included.  
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articles over 8 years. The year of entry into the research community is a better 
adjustment for tenure effects compared with age. Age does not account for the effective 
time a scholar is part of the community. In particular US scholars often start their 
research careers after they had careers in the industry.  
3.4. Control variables 
Additionally we included several control variables, which may affect editorial board 
membership and are related to the publication record of a scholar but do not necessarily 
reflect ]uality aspects. 
Co-authorship. We took into account the average number of co-authors per article. 
For each scholar we took the sum of co-authors over all articles and divided it by the 
number of articles. Scholars with a higher number of co-authors may increase the 
number of published articles due to economies of scale. Further, they may have a higher 
direct influence within their research community and thus a higher likelihood of 
becoming a board member. 
Citations. For every scholar we measured the average number of citations per 
article. The index is a proxy of scholars’ visibility, for example due to conducting high 
]uality research, publishing dominant theories, being the target of herding behaviour, or 
engaging in citation networks aMoed et al. (1Q85)g. Authors who have a high visibility 
may increase their publication record and their likelihood of becoming a board member. 
We adjusted the number of citations by the age of each publication.  
 
articles
  Citations npublicatio of Age
artcileper  Citations
"
""
#  
Journal Impact. We also controlled for the average journal impact factor per article 
aThe Thomson Corporation (2008)g. This index measures the likelihood of board 
membership due to reputation effects. Authors publishing in highly visible journals may 
gain higher visibility themselves.  
Entry Year. Even though the former measurements were adjusted for tenure effects 
we additionally controlled for entry year, i.e. the year of the first publication. 
Established scholars have a higher probability to become an editorial board member. 
They can demonstrate a continuous publication history and have accumulated a higher 
stock of expert knowledge. They also have higher social capital. Due to their expert 
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knowledge, experience, and social capital such scholars may have a higher yearly 
publication record. 
Pages. We measured the average number of pages per article. `onger articles may be 
an indication for more essential research aHofmeister and Ursprung (2008)g and thus 
increase the probability of publishing or becoming an editorial board member. 
However, the lengths of an article may not necessarily reflect ]uality aspects. It could 
also reflect different research streams (e.g. theoretical research). ,oth issues may affect 
publication record as well as editorial board membership. 
3.5. Independent variable for robustness test 
Corrected Research Output. We tested the robustness of our results by applying a 
adjusted indicator for research evaluation as suggested by Hofmeister and Ursprung 
a(2008)g. Instead of counting the number of A+-articles this output measurement tries to 
capture ]uality and effort aspects. The index multiplies the number of pages with the 
journal impact factor and corrects for the number of co-authors. Hofmeister and 
Ursprung a(2008)g suggest to apply this index within the Handelsblatt-Ranking.12  
n tenurepublicatio
 Output Research  Corrected # articleper  authors-Co
articleper Impact  Journal*Articleper  Pages"
                                                
  
For descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations please contact the authors. 
3.6. Analysis 
We use poisson regression analysis to predict the dependent count variables jEditor 
,oard Membershipk and j,oard Membershipk and include the linear and ]uadratic term 
of publication record. The distributions of the independent variables jpublication 
recordk, jco-authorshipk, jcitationsk, and jpagesk are extremely skewed and may 
bastardize the regression results due to outliers. We transformed these variables by 
taking the logarithm. We applied three robustness checks. First, we ran separate 
regression models for each entry year. Second, for one of the most important journals, 
 
12 Currently, the following formula is applied:  
" $# 1)articelper  authors-(Co
articelper Impact  Journal*2  recordn Publicatio  
The formula corrects for the number of co-authors, but not in a linear way. For example, in a journal with 
the impact j1k an article without co-authors obtains the value j1k, with one co-author the value j.67k and 
with two co-authors the value j.5k. 
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we ran a regression model that included former editorial board members. Third, we 
tested if our results held with respect to the corrected measure of research output. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive Findings 
Table 2 presents the descriptive results of a ranking of scholars according to the 
number of editorial boards on which they serve. The table shows every scholar holding 
three or more jEditor ,oard Membershipk positions. The table compares their positions 
with the position of these scholars in two publication rankings. To obtain publication 
positions we rank all scholars of our sample according to their yearly (a) publication 
record and (b) corrected research output in our sample13. The results show that among 
the 48 scholars holding three or more editorial board positions only 3 scholars would be 
ranked among the 100 most successful scholars in a ranking according to publication 
record. The table further shows that only 3 of scholars would be ranked among the 100 
most successful scholars in a ranking according to corrected research output. Figure 1 
provides a graphical overview of how an editorial board membership ranking is related 
to a ranking according to the publication record of a scholar. According to the results, 
many scholars listed in a publication ranking in the foremost ranks are not even listed in 
a ]uality ranking, while many scholars listed in a board membership ranking in the 
foremost ranks would be listed in a ]uantity ranking in the lowest ranks. The results 
confirm that a ranking of individual scholars is highly dependent on the type of ranking 
used. 
Table 2 t Figure 1 about here 
4.2. Statistical Findings 
The results of the poisson regression analysis are shown for jEditor ,oard 
Membershipk and j,oard Membershipk in Table 3.  
Linear model. In the linear model the publication record of a scholar shows a strong 
positive effect on the number of board membership positions (see column I and III). The 
                                                 
13 Of course one could argue that all publications of these scholars should be included and not only their 
publications in the 11 journals. However, all rankings are restricted to this list of journals and only 
articles published in these journals were counted. In contrast to many rankings our journal list was not 
selected randomly but by means of community aspects.  
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explanatory power of the model significantly improves if the linear term of publication 
record is included (Model Improvement for editor board membership: 20.85***, Model 
Improvement for board membership: 12.Q3***). The results show that in general 
scholars with more previous publications have a higher probability of being selected as 
a board member. 
Table 3 about here 
Quadratic model. Column II and IV report the results when the ]uadratic terms of 
publication record were also included. Compared with the linear model the explanatory 
power significantly improves if the ]uadratic term is included (Model Improvement for 
editor board membership: 14Q.08***, Model Improvement for board membership: 
130.30***). A comparison of the CH2-statistic, indicating the improvement of the 
explanatory power of a statistical model, between the linear and ]uadratic model 
demonstrates that a model that includes the ]uadratic model is significantly more 
capable to explain the appointment of scholars in editorial boards. Thus, even if the 
overall effect of the publication record on board membership is positive, the link 
between the measure of ]uantitative rankings and the measure of ]ualitative rankings is 
not strictly linear. 
Figure 2 about here 
Figure 2 shows the predicted curve shape with the example of board membership 
(results of table 3, column II). The results support our hypothesis by showing that the 
publication record of a scholar shows an inverse, U-shaped relationship to his or her 
number of editorial board membership positions. According to the results authors with a 
yearly publication record of around 0.8 articles have the highest chance to be elected as 
a board member. A lower publication record as well as a higher publication record 
decreases this probability. Thus, journals are indeed interested to appoint board 
members who show a constant publication history but they are not interested in having 
board members who show a very large number of publications.  
4.3. Robustness check  
We made three robustness checks to validate the results.  
 1Q
First, we analyzed the data to see if the curvilinear relationship is driven by tenure 
effects. Even if we controlled for the year of first publication it is possible that 
especially experienced scholars show a medium or low publication record. We therefore 
divided the sample in sub-groups according to the variable jentry yeark and ran separate 
regression for groups of scholars who started to publish within the same year. The 
results show that the curvilinear effect of the publication record is robust and significant 
(for the results please contact the authors). The effects get weaker for scholars with very 
short community tenure. 
Second, we analyzed the data to see if the inclusion of former board members were 
to change the results. As many journals rotate their editorial boards it may be the case 
that researchers no longer are members of the board but are still well respected and were 
on the board in the past. The inclusion of these scholars could change our results. We 
selected the Academy of Management Journal (AMJ) because they had recently 
changed their editorial board. We predicted the membership in the current and/or former 
AMJ board by including the data for all authors who had published at least one AMJ-
article between 1QQ7-2007. The inclusion of these individuals did not change our 
general findings of a curvilinear effect of publication record on board membership (for 
the results please contact the authors). We also validated the findings on the AMJ board 
by excluding all scholars who already had served as a former board member but did not 
serve on the board in 200Q. The findings also show a significant curvilinear effect. 
Third, proponents of ]uantitative rankings often argue that rankings measure every 
aspect of research ]uality if they are correctly administrated. For example Hofmeister 
and Ursprung a(2008)g suggest that ]uality and effort aspects of research are better 
captured if output indicators multiply the number of pages per article by the journal 
impact factor of an article and further correct for the number of co-authors. We counted 
the index for every scholar in our sample. Table 3 shows the results.  
In the linear model the results show again that scholars with a higher research output 
have more board member positions (column V and VII). Column VI and VIII report the 
results when the ]uadratic terms of research output where also included. The negative 
and significant ]uadratic terms support again that also the corrected research output of a 
scholar shows an inverse, U-shaped relationship to his or her number of board 
membership positions. Compared with the linear model the additional explanatory 
power of the ]uadratic model is however lower as in Table 3. It indicates that the 
corrected research output of a scholar may be a better measurement of jresearch 
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]ualityk as simple publication counts. However, even the corrected measure of 
]uantitative rankings and the measure of ]ualitative rankings is not strictly linear. The 
results thus substantiate that ]uantitative and ]ualitative rankings do not show the same 
results with respect to the position of scholar within both rankings. 
We made also robustness checks by calculating research output with a formula that 
instead of using the journal impact factor values an A+-publication with Q, a A- 
publication with 3 and a ,- publication with 1 (journal ]uality is measured according to 
the Jour]ual 2008). The results are comparable to the former results.14   
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
We have argued that ]uantitative rankings, e.g. publication or citation measures, 
capture only some aspects of scientific ]uality. For that reason, an alternative ranking 
system has been developed. It is based on membership on academic editorial boards of 
professional journals. This j]ualitativek ranking considers the reputation and 
recognition of scholars among their peers and recognizes their contributions to the 
research community in terms of reading and reviewing the work of others. We compare 
the results of ]uantitative and ]ualitative measures. The empirical results indicate that 
the position of a scholar in ]ualitative rankings, i.e. using the selection in editorial 
boards as a ]uality indicator is not strictly related linearly but rather in an inverted U- 
shaped way to his/her position in ]uantitative rankings, i.e. his/her number of (A+) 
publications. Especially for scholars scoring high in publication rankings, our study 
suggests that rankings based on ]uantity of publications are incompatible with rankings 
based on membership on editorial boards. This suggests that the two indices do not 
measure the same phenomenon. Science needs both types of scholarse those who are 
productive in terms of publishing and those who are productive in terms of running 
journals. For that reason, research evaluations should consider multiple criteria rather 
than publication or citation counts only. 
This conclusion is in line with prior research. Henrekson t Waldenstrom a(2007)g 
ranked every full professor in economics in Sweden using seven established measures 
of research performance. Their analysis shows that the ranking can vary greatly across 
measures and that depending on the measure used the distribution of total research 
                                                 
14 It should be noted that we are not able to overcome possible endogeneity problems. It seems plausible 
that the election of a scholar in editorial boards may increase its publication output. This bias should be 
however small because the u-shaped relationship between publication output and editorial board 
membership suggests that editorial board members do not have a maximum of publications. 
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output is valued very differently. This finding is also validated by other authors aCoupq 
(2003)e Donovan and ,utler (2007)e `o et al. (2008)g suggesting that research ]uality 
can only be captured through multiple indicators. This result is in line with bibliometric 
research that warns against using publications and citations as the only measure to 
capture the research effort of individuals, especially individuals in the social sciences 
avan Raan (2003)g. 
For the career decisions of individual scholars, bibliometric rankings should be used 
with utmost care. jCrude rankings … cannot be helpful to the policy makerk aJohnes 
(1Q88): 177g. Funding agencies and other decision makers desiring to evaluate the 
research efforts of individual researchers or of the whole university sector should go 
beyond applying standard ]uantitative measures of research performance to the social 
sciences aKatz (1QQQ)e `uwel et al. (1QQQ)e Council for the Humanities Arts and Social 
Sciences (2005)g. Research ]uality is diverse, uncertain, and multidimensional. It is 
highly ]uestionable that there exists one, true indicator of research ]uality, which 
captures the efforts of scientists within all research communities to the same extent. In 
some communities, for example, only empirical research constitutes good research, 
while in other communities to pose a novel research ]uestion or to contribute an 
original theory is more important. For this reason, indicators capturing research ]uality 
are not only multidimensional, but also highly dependent on the specific research 
community. However, what are the alternatives for research evaluationv 
One possibility to solve the multiple-tasking problem would be to measure all the 
aspects important for an academic career: teaching, supporting younger scholars, 
connecting to the public, and participating in academic administration or editorial board 
membership aFrey (2010)g. However, attempting to measure this would lead to an 
enormous amount of evaluation, and scholars would invariably find ways to nnbeat the 
system’’.  
A ]uite different option would be to return to approved methods, i.e. to an overall 
evaluation of (young) scholars based on the intuitive knowledge of seasoned scholars 
aFrey (2010)g. There are various possibilities to select such persons. An attractive option 
would be to elect them by a vote among the members of the respective professional 
organization. This would ensure that the peers making up the nnRepublic of Science’’ 
remain in control. The scholars selected by such a procedure would be under the 
scrutiny of the profession as a whole and would lose their reputation among their peers 
if they pushed unfounded personal interests. The chosen scholars would have an 
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incentive to decide as objectively as possible while maintaining an un-biased 
perspective. This option offers the members of professional organizations more 
competence and control compared to the system prevailing today and helps them to 
fight the unilateral tendency of young scholars to put their whole effort into publishing 
A-articles while neglecting other tasks. Nevertheless, such a procedure is viewed as 
nnunscientific’’ as it is not based on the allegedly objective calculation of publications in 
A-journals. However, such a view is too simple. According to recent psychological 
research, nngut feelings’’ are often superior to in-depth analyses abladwell (2005)e 
bigerenzer (2007)g. Indeed, many established scholars proceed in this way when they 
exchange their views about younger scholars. What matters to them is indeed that they 
feel good about a young scholar, and not whether someone has published an article in a 
particular A-journal. Using the intuitive knowledge of seasoned scholars has, of course, 
disadvantages. There is certainly the danger of promoting an nnold boys’ network’’ 
giving young scholars an incentive to pander to the seasoned scholars. Personality and 
friendship may matter more than research excellence because gut feelings are to some 
extent influenced by such perceptions. On the other hand, these alleged disadvantages 
should not be overrated. It should not be forgotten that the present system focusing on 
A-journal publications is also influenced by personal relationships and preferences, as 
well as by selfish interests. It has, for instance, become common practice to abundantly 
and positively cite possible referees to raise the chance of acceptance. Even more 
importantly, scholars in dire need of their articles are induced to follow the referees’ 
nnadvice’’ even if they differ from their own insights and views. This behavior has been 
called nnacademic prostitution’’ aFrey (2003)g.  
A third possibility is to restrict publication rankings to the early years of a scientific 
career aOsterloh and Frey (2008)g. Scientists initially must learn the tools of the trade 
and must show that they are able to use them with profit. Thereafter, one should let 
scholars proceed as they see fit for themselves. This allows them to then exhibit their 
intrinsic motivation in scientific research (at least) for the remaining part of the career. 
An obvious disadvantage of this is that scholars in later stages of their careers are not 
subjected to any external monitoring and may no longer engage themselves in research. 
This may well be the case but an academic system should be designed to enable the best 
rather than to prevent the worst.  
Yet another possibility would be to more openly shape several levels of scientific 
careers aFrey (2010)g. In particular, there should be careers at universities and research 
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institutes for which it is sufficient to have published in one or a few of the hundreds of 
general and specialized journals, or also in the form of books and internet publications, 
as well as participation in current public debates. Such a policy would serve to produce 
a broader portfolio in the management profession with respect to type of contribution, 
content, techni]ues and universities. Through the present focus on A-level publications, 
diversityxa crucial re]uirement to guarantee originalityxis indeed threatened as 
aOsterloh and Frey (2008)g.  
Each of these (and possibly other) options has both its advantages and disadvantages, 
which must be carefully considered. This article does not propagate any of the options 
discussed but wants to call attention to the major shortcomings of ]uantitative rankings: 
Publication or citation rankings disregard important scholarly contributions, e.g. the 
investment in multiple and/or difficult tasks, which are, important for research. In the 
long run ]uantitative research rankings may therefore crowd out such contributions, 
worsening, instead of improving, research ]uality. 
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7. Tables  
Table 1. Top-Journals of the management and organization research community 
 I II III IV V VI VII 
Journal Rank/ 
2007 
JCR1 
2007 
JCR1 Rank of 
81 
ManagementJ. 
2007 
JCR1 
Rank of 
12Q 
,usinessJ.
200Q  
H,2 ,W`
2008  
Jour]ual3 
wiss. 
QualitCt 
2008  
Jour]ual
Rating3
Rank/ 
1QQ7-2007 
Citations 
per 
Reference4
Academy of Management Journal (1) 5.02 (2) (2) 1 Q.08 A+ (11) 1.27
Academy of Management Review (2) 4.37 (3) (3) 1 Q.07 A+ (Q) 1.4Q 
Organization Science (3) 3.13 (4) (6) 0.7 8.Q0 A (7) 2.38 
Administrative Science Quarterly (4) 2.Q1 (5) (7) 1 Q.48 A+ (10) 1.43
Strategic Management Journal (5) 2.83 (6) (8) 0.7 8.41 A (8) 1.77 
Journal of Intern. ,usiness Studies (6) 2.28 (10) (12) 0.7 8.81 A (5) 3.33 
Organization Studies (7) 2.04 (12) (15) 0.7 7.QQ , (3) 5.30 
Journal of Management (8) 2.00 (13) (16) 0.7 7.85 , (6) 3.27 
Journal of Organizational ,ehavior (Q) 1.Q8 (14) (17) 0.7 7.40 , (4) 3.41 
Journal of Management Studies (10) 1.Q3 (16) (1Q) 0.7 7.55 , (2) 6.1Q 
,ritish Journal of Management (11) 1.53 (27) (36) 0.5 7.28 , (1) 8.Q6 
`egend:  
1 Journal Citation Report (JCR) of the ISI Web of Knowledge aThe Thomson Corporation (2008)g. It 
indicates how often an article gets cited within the first two years after publishing.  
2 Handelsblatt (H,) Ranking ,W` aHandelsblatt (200Q)g. Journals scores reach from 1.0 to 0.0. Higher 
value indicates higher journal impact. Journal scores are obtained from a combination of journal citation 
reports and reputation rankings.  
3 Official journal ranking of the VH, aHennig-Thurau et al. (2004)g. Higher values indicate higher 
journal impact. Journal scores are obtained from survey data and intend to capture ]uality aspects.  
4 Self-constructed measurement: Journal Impact } !references per article/!citations per article. Sample: 
T}1QQ7-2007, N}5,7Q4 authors with 5,50Q articles.  
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Table 2. Editorial ,oards according to Individual Scholars 
Scholar name Number of Editor 
,oard 
Membership 
Positions  
(editor, co-editor 
or board member) 
Number of Editor 
Positions  
(editor, co-editor) 
Publication 
Record (Ranking 
Position according 
to Publication 
Record) 
Corrected 
Research Output 
(Ranking Position 
according to 
Corrected 
Research Output) 
Cannella, AA           6 0 0.Q7 (82) 38.35 (131) 
Reuer, JJ                   5 2 0.Q3 (Q3) 31.07 (213) 
Floyd, SW                5 2 0.73 (213) 16.83 (7Q2) 
Inkpen, A                 5 0 0.6Q (488) 24.8Q (381) 
Hodgkinson, bP       5 0 0.6Q (488) 6.2 (2463) 
`epak, D                  5 1 0.44 (1188) 10.72 (1466) 
Hitt, MA                   4 0 1.2Q (18) 4Q.07 (73) 
`ounsbury, M          4 2 0.76 (183) 4Q.65 (72) 
Cornelissen, JP         4 2 0.6Q (488) 34.67 (160) 
Kostova, T               4 0 0.64 (7Q8) 2Q.24 (24Q) 
Henisz, WJ               4 2 0.63 (80Q) 27.61 (302) 
Ashkanasy, NM       4 2 0.63 (80Q) 12.7Q (1205) 
Foss, NJ                   4 0 0.51 (1010) 17.1Q (766) 
,artunek, JM           4 0 0.4Q (10Q1) 16.48 (817) 
Jarzabkowski, P       4 0 0.34 (2021) 15 (Q4Q) 
Maitlis, S                  3 0 0.88 (124) 73.14 (20) 
beorge, JM              3 0 0.88 (124) 26.68 (330) 
Dobrev, SD              3 0 0.76 (183) 41.76 (105) 
,irkinshaw, J           3 0 0.75 (18Q) 22.Q3 (444) 
breenwood, R          3 0 0.74 (1Q8) 30.73 (215) 
Hoskisson, RE         3 2 0.74 (1Q8) 24.1 (3Q4) 
Filatotchev, I            3 0 0.74 (1Q8) 16.01 (868) 
McNamara, bM       3 0 0.7 (21Q) 20.7 (53Q) 
Shen, W                   3 0 0.6Q (488) 28.Q7 (256) 
Certo, ST                  3 0 0.6Q (488) 1Q.01 (645) 
Takeuchi, R              3 0 0.6Q (488) 16.05 (852) 
Chang, SJ                 3 2 0.64 (7Q8) 28.QQ (255) 
Roth, K                     3 1 0.64 (7Q8) 26.01 (356) 
,rass, DJ                  3 0 0.64 (7Q8) 1Q.85 (582) 
,ansal, P                  3 0 0.63 (80Q) 2Q.4Q (247) 
Makino, S                 3 0 0.61 (832) 16.41 (820) 
Delios, A                  3 2 0.61 (832) 2.36 (4180) 
,alogun, J                3 0 0.5Q (854) 23.53 (415) 
Ethiraj, SK               3 0 0.56 (8Q3) 30.4 (220) 
beorge, b                 3 0 0.56 (8Q3) 21.72 (4Q4) 
Swaminathan, A       3 2 0.53 (Q57) 24.67 (385) 
Tallman, S,             3 2 0.53 (Q57) 11.5 (1363) 
,aker, T                   3 0 0.51 (1010) 21 (524) 
Anand, J                   3 0 0.4Q (10Q1) 13.75 (108Q) 
Jensen, M                 3 0 0.47 (111Q) 40.Q2 (111) 
Sorge, A                   3 1 0.47 (111Q) 14.Q1 (Q56) 
Durand, R                 3 0 0.45 (1162) 17.78 (72Q) 
Delbridge, R             3 0 0.44 (1188) 6.01 (2535) 
Suddaby, R               3 0 0.41 (1542) 22.68 (455) 
Chattopadhyay, P     3 0 0.37 (1870) 14.5 (1012) 
Sparrowe, RT           3 0 0.37 (1870) 12.71 (1207) 
Seidl, D                    3 0 0.34 (2021) 12.62 (1216) 
Robson, M               3 1 0 (5635) 0 (5387) 
The table includes all persons with three or more board memberships (according to the broad definition). 
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Table 3. Determinants of ,oard and Editor ,oard Membership 
Dependent Variable: Board Membership Editor Board Membership 
 Coef. SD Sig. Coef. SD Sig. Coef. SD Sig. Coef. SD Sig.
 I   II   III   IV   
(Constant) 6Q.8Q 30.Q6 * 163.Q3 33.25 *** 46.60 33.15  142.68 35.57 ***
Publication record (lnskew0) 1.08 0.23 *** 7.36 .65 *** 0.Q2 0.25 *** 7.40 0.71 ***
Publication record (lnskew0)2  -5.68 .57 ***   -5.Q6 0.64 ***
Co-authorship (lnskew0) 1.53 0.12 *** 1.26 .13 *** 1.58 0.13 *** 1.31 0.14 ***
Citations (lnskew0) 0.14 0.06 ** 0.20 .06 *** 0.17 0.06 ** 0.23 0.06 ***
Pages (lnskew0) 0.38 0.11 *** 0.37 .11 *** 0.36 0.11 *** 0.33 0.12 ** 
Journal Impact 0.18 0.04 *** 0.15 .04 *** 0.21 0.04 *** 0.17 0.04 ***
Entry Year -0.04 0.02 * -0.08 .02 *** -0.03 0.02 -0.07 0.02 ***
Pseudo R2 .1Q2 .216  .174 .1Q6
`og likelihood -2513.74 -243Q.20  -2360.36 -22Q5.21
`R-Chi2 13Q7.0Q *** 1346.17 ***  QQ1.72 *** 1122.02 ***
Model Improvement `R Chi2 
by including Publication record (lnskew0)
20.85 ***   12.Q3 ***  
Model Improvement `R Chi2 
by including Publication record (lnskew0)2
 14Q.08 ***   130.30 ***
N 5,7Q4 5,7Q4  5,7Q4 5,7Q4
 V   VI   VII   VIII   
(Constant) 362.20 1Q.13 *** 35Q.64 1Q.16 *** 376.5Q 18.08 *** 373.73 18.10 ***
Corrected Research Output (lnskew0) .Q1 .03 *** 1.17 .13 ***
3 *
.Q3 .03 *** 1.25 .13 ***
*Corrected Research Output (lnskew0)2    -.06 07 *.0     -. .03  
Citations (lnskew0) -.01 .01 -.01 .01 -.01 .01 -.01 .01
Entry Year -.18 .01 *** -.18 .01 *** -.1Q .01 *** -.1Q .01 ***
Pseudo R2 .158 .158  .173 .174
`og likelihood -2406.28 -2403.Q1  -2575.53 -2571.83
`R-Chi2 8QQ.88 *** Q04.61 ***  1073.52 *** 1080.Q2 ***
Model Improvement `R Chi2 
by including Publication record (lnskew0)
746.4Q ***   876.68 ***  
Model Improvement `R Chi2 
by including Publication record (lnskew0)2
 4.73 *   7.40 ** 
N 5,7Q4 5,7Q4  5,7Q4 5,7Q4
`egend: Possion Regression, ~ p  0.10, *p  0.05, **p  0.01, *** p  0.001 
lnskew0 indicates the zero-skewness logarithm of a variables, i.e. the variable is added with the constant j1k so that the logarithm can be also taken from values of j0k  
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8. Figures  
Figure 1. Ranking Comparison of Individual Scholars according to Editorial ,oard 
Membership and Publication Record 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Predicted Relationship between Publication Record and ,oard Membership 
   
